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ON KNOWING ONE'S CHAINS AND DECKING 
THEM WITH FLOWERS: LIMITS ON 
PATIENT AUTONOMY IN "THE 
SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR 
AND PATIENT" 
CHARLES H. BARON* 
In Chapter VI of The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, I Jay 
Katz admits to the reader that, despite his very strong belief in patient 
autonomy, even he reaches a point where he would feel entitled to 
overrule a patient's decision to refuse treatment: "Despite all that I 
have said so far, rare situations may arise when patients' choices 
should not be honored" (p. 156). As an example, he offers the case of 
Mr. D., "a previously healthy 66-year-old black man who had come to 
the emergency room [of Dr. Mark Siegler] suffering from an acute feb-
rile illness of three days' duration"2 (p. 156). Although Mr. D. con-
sented to hospitalization, X-rays, and antibiotics for what appeared to 
be a critical illness, he refused two diagnostic procedures-a bronchial 
brushing to obtain lung tissue and a bone marrow examination-
which were uncomfortable but routine and "medically necessary" for 
his proper treatment. When his physicians repeatedly attempted to 
explain the necessity for these procedures, Mr. D. became angry and 
began to refuse even routine blood tests and X-rays. A day later, Mr. 
D. appeared to be near death. He then refused to be placed on a respi-
rator. A psychiatric consultant had interviewed Mr. D. and con-
cluded "that Mr. D. understood the severity of his illness ... and that 
he was making a rational choice in refusing the tests" (p. 156). Dr. 
Siegler himself had conducted two forty-five minute interviews with 
the patient and had concluded that Mr. D. 
understood the gravity of his situation. For example, when I told 
him he was dying, he replied: "Everyone has to die. If! die now, I 
• Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; A.B., University of Pennsylvania, 
1958; L.L.B., Harvard Law School, 1961 ; Ph.D. , University of Pennsylvania, 1972. 
I. J. KATZ, THE SIl.ENT WORl.D OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) [hereinafter 
KATZ). 
2. See also Siegler, Critical Illness: The Limits of Autonomy, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Oct. 1977, at 12. 
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am ready." When I asked him if he came to the hospital to be 
helped, he stated: "I want to be helped. I want you to treat me with 
whatever medicine you think I need. I don't want any more tests 
and I don't want the breathing machine." 
I gradually became convinced that despite the severity of his 
illness and his high fever, he was making a conscious, rational deci-
sion to selectively refuse a particular kind of treatment (p. 156). 
On the basis of these determinations regarding competency, Dr. Sie-
gler decided to respect Mr. D.'s objections and allow him to die. 
Professor Katz recognizes that Dr. Siegler based this decision 
upon a "belief in the rights of individuals to determine their own desti-
nies" much like his own. "Yet," he concludes, "I might not have de-
ferred to Mr. D.'s wishes, if he had without any explanation persisted 
in his refusal to undergo diagnostic tests" (p. 157). "Had Mr. D. been 
unwilling to give me his reasons for the refusal, I might have gone 
forward with the diagnostic tests" (p. 157). Professor Katz recognizes 
as well that some may view his position as surprising in light of the 
strong defense of patient autonomy which is the burden of every other 
portion of his book. Thus he admits to an obligation to "both define 
the conditions in which a physician ought to consider taking such ac-
tion and justify such exceptions to the rule of respecting patients' 
choices" (p. 157). He immediately goes on to perform the first task in 
a simple and direct fashion. However, his effort to deal with the sec-
ond not only seems to fail in its narrow goal but reveals problems in 
the central thesis of the book. 
Under what conditions would he consider disobeying a patient's 
choice? Only when the situation meets two conditions: "One, the con-
sequences of non-intervention pose grave risks to a patient's immediate 
physical condition and, two, the process of thinking about choices is 
so seriously impaired that neither physician nor patient seem to know 
what one or both wish to convey to the other" (pp. 156-57). Of 
course, the first condition sounds very much like the traditional basis 
for forcing treatment employed by the physicians whom Professor 
Katz criticizes. Thus, his emphasis is on the second condition. "The 
first condition ... is only a necessary one for the intervention, it is not 
decisive by itself. Interference with patients' choices must also meet 
another test: The process of thinking about choices must be seriously 
impaired" (p. 158). But what exactly does Professor Katz mean by 
such "serious impairment" and why does such impairment justify 
overruling patient choices? Without clear answers to these questions 
one might be left with the uneasy feeling that Professor Katz has of-
fered us psychiatric paternalism as a replacement for medical paternal-
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ism. Although physicians could no longer force treatment on patients 
on the ground that physical health demands it, they might force such 
treatment on patients where mental health demanded it. This might 
still represent a net gain for advocates of patient autonomy,3 in that 
the new paternalism would justify fewer interventions than the old-at 
least in theory. But why should "psychiatric necessity" have any 
greater power to override patient objections than "medical necessity?" 
I believe that the book does provide a basis for a good answer as 
to why impairment of the process of discussion with patients about 
their choices might justify intervention by doctors. However, 
although this answer is based upon Professor Katz's insights, it differs 
in significant respects from any version of a justification which Profes-
sor Katz provides in his book. As I will attempt to show, Professor 
Katz's arguments fail to the extent that they preserve, in this portion 
of the book, medical traditions of pretense to omnipotence which he 
eschews at almost every other point in it. The author takes us only 
part of the way to enlightenment when he urges doctors to be honest 
with themselves and their patients about the uncertainties of medicine 
and their own professional limitations. What he misses is the occa-
sional need for doctors to be honest about their personal limitations, 
their human weaknesses and needs. Professor Katz's arguments for 
forced intervention can hope to succeed, I contend, only after they are 
translated into terms which draw on this honest recognition of the 
humanity of physicians. However, as I will attempt to show, to the 
extent that this honest recognition of physician need is shared with 
patients, the very act of communicating the need is likely to make 
unnecessary the forced intervention which the need communicated 
otherwise would be used to justify. 
At the beginning of the last paragraph on page 158, after intro-
ducing his conditions for intervention, Professor Katz states: "Before 
trying to justify why the overruling of patients' choices should be 
given serious consideration if these two conditions prevail, I want to 
say more about Mr. D." Four pages later, at the beginning of the last 
paragraph on page 162, he says: "I appreciate the problem of occa-
sional coercion that my prescription raises. While no principle can 
rule absolute, induding the principle of freedom of choice, exceptions 
to it must be most narrowly circumscribed and justified. Let me add 
3. For my own position strongly in favor of patient autonomy, see Baron, Licensure 
of Health Care Prof essionals: The Consumer's Case for Abolition , 9 AM. J.L. & M ED. 335 
(1983); Baron, Medical Paternalism and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Reiman , 4 A M. 
J. L. & MED. 337 (1979). 
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to what I have already said about justifications."4 Clearly, we are be-
ing told to look in those four intervening pages for important state-
ments as to what justifies narrowly circumscribed intervention. But, 
as it turns out, what is there will yield only to the reader who is willing 
to work hard to find it. 
In great part, the four pages are taken up with the discussion of 
three cases: Mr. D.'s, a second case involving a fifty-seven year old 
woman who would not consent to a hysterectomy because she refused 
to believe that she had cancer, and a third involving a fifteen year old 
girl who refused high risk heart surgery on the ground that, despite 
doctors' assurances to the contrary, she would suffer "intolerable" 
post-operative pain. In the two latter cases, doctors ultimately were 
able to obtain consent from the patients by eliciting their hidden con-
cerns and allaying them. Continued conversation elicited from the 
fifty-seven year old woman the fact that prejudice prevented her from 
accepting the dire cancer diagnosis from her treating physician be-
cause he was black. Discussions with a white doctor and the patient's 
daughter led her to drop her objections to surgery. "Without sus-
tained conversation her reasons for the initial refusal of a hysterec-
tomy might never have been clarified and condemned her to an 
unnecessary death" (p. 161). Continued conversation also led the fif-
teen year old to opt for her operation and resulted in a happy ending. 
Consulted by her physicians, Professor Katz had been moved to sug-
gest that a psychiatric social worker talk to the patient in an attempt 
to "clarify the confusion between childhood memories and current re-
alities" (p. 162). 
I was able to throw some light on the mystery of her concern 
over pain and suffering. As I listened to her doctors, I recalled 
painful memories, reported by patients in psychoanalytic treatment, 
about childhood operations. These stories depicted the sudden shift 
from happy childhood memories to painful ones about hospitals and 
operations, memories of physical discomfort that were augmented 
by psychic suffering and confusion over what my patients had per-
ceived as a "betrayal" by previously caring parents who, they felt , 
had cruelly turned against them. I wondered whether such excruci-
atingly painful, unconscious memories might not have influenced 
her decision (pp. 161-62). 
Again, continuing conversation had done the trick. In the instance of 
the fifteen year old, "the availability of a person who could draw on 
his professional experiences made the resolution of a puzzling problem 
4. (emphasis added). 
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easier. Yet, even if I had not been there, a commitment to conversa-
tion might have brought about the same result" (p. 162). 
In the case of Mr. D., Professor Katz can only imagine what dif-
ference continuing conversation might have made. Perhaps Mr. D. 
believed the proposed diagnostic tests to be experimental rather than a 
diagnostic necessity. This belief might have been a result of the fact 
that he knew himself to be at a teaching hospital. In fact, Dr. Siegler 
found out only after Mr. D.'s death that he had, ten years earlier, 
signed himself out of a hospital after refusing a bone marrow 
examination. 
Since in the intervening years he had not been any worse off for his 
refusal, he might have wondered whether this test was not equally 
unnecessary now. Had he told me about this experience, perhaps I 
could have impressed on him that the two situations were not neces-
sarily comparable. From there, we could have gone on to talk about 
his mistrust of doctors and the uncertainties of medicine. Who 
knows what else we might then have explored (pp. 159-60). 
It is easy to be swept along by Professor Katz's description of a 
world in which everyone gains by the doctor's intervention. In two 
cases, a commitment to conversation led to what appeared to be in-
formed consent to "medically necessary" procedures. In a third, it 
might have led to such consent if it had been pursued. Does Professor 
Katz think that that fact gave him the right to force such conversation 
on Mr. D. if he had refused it? Apparently he does. Of Mr. D.'s case 
he says: 
If on the basis of my nagging and unanswered questions I had inter-
vened, I would not have done so because I thought his decision un-
wise, foolish or whatever, but because I had no idea whatever why 
he had decided what he did. I would have felt confused and been 
uncertain whether he was confused as well (p. 160). 
And at the conclusion of his discussion of the two other cases he 
states: "Both stories, I believe, reinforce the lessons to be learned from 
Mr. D.'s case: the obligation to converse so that misconceptions, con-
fusion, fears, and ignorance can be clarified; and the necessity not to 
accept prematurely patients' refusal to engage in such conversations" 
(p. 162). If we leave the justification for intervention at this, then he 
has surely replaced medical paternalism with psychiatric paternalism. 
Conversing about reasons for refusing treatment is necessary for the 
patient's mental health; thus the doctor and patient are obligated to 
converse whether or not the patient wants it. 
Happily, however, Professor Katz's justification for intervention 
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need not be left at this. Other observations which he makes-almost 
in passing at times-provide a basis for a slightly altered form of inter-
vention; one which might well furnish him with everything he wants in 
a fashion more consistent with all of the valuable things in the rest of 
this excellent book. At the point on page 162 where he speaks of ad-
ding "to what I have already said about justifications," he goes on to 
say: 
Respect for patients' vulnerability to ill-considered thoughts and ac-
tions requires that they engage in conversation. Physicians however, 
also have needs that deserve respect. In situations like Mr. D.'s, their 
strong ethical commitment to caring for patients can impose intoler-
able burdens on them. In these instances, doctors may never know 
whether they have explained themselves satisfactorily to their pa-
tients. Doctors may then doubt whether they have taken the neces-
sary time or made the necessary effort to make themselves 
understood. Such doubts can lead to nagging guilt feelings over 
having failed in one's professional obligations. Assuaging guilt-in-
ducing doubts that may haunt physicians for a lifetime is another 
reason for my insistence on conversation (pp. 162-63).5 
The theme of the needs of physicians as a basis for justifying their 
intervention in patient decisionmaking surfaces at other places in the 
book. For example, Professor Katz states in Chapter V that: 
[R]espect for the great importance physicians place on beneficence 
and loyalty to their patients may suggest that physicians have a 
right and need to be informed why their patients do not choose to 
follow a proposed course of action so that doctors can be reasonably 
certain that their patients have understood their recommendations 
(p. 112). 
The "needs of physicians" basis for intervention explains much 
that would otherwise seem inexplicable in the book. For example, in 
his discussion of Mr. D.'s case, Professor Katz asks "What could Mr. 
D. have told me that would have led me to bow to his decision?" He 
then answers: "It is easy to answer this question at the other end of 
the continuum from patients' silence to communication. For example, 
if Mr. D. had been a Jehovah's Witness and refused tests on religious 
grounds, I would have still talked to him but readily accepted his deci-
sion" (p. 160). Why should such grounds be so readily accepted and 
others not be? It would seem to be because they "assuage the guilt-
inducing doubts" there might otherwise be that the patient is refusing 
treatment because the doctor has failed somehow in his or her role. 
5. (emphasis added). 
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The patient is refusing treatment for reasons beyond the control of the 
doctor-the patient's indoctrination by the church-and not because 
"we had not been able to clarify misconceptions, distortions and igno-
rance, and that I had not been able to impress on him that he mattered 
and was worthy of my time and effort" (p. 160). 
But if it is the needs of physicians which, in the end, justify Pro-
fessor Katz's intervention in a treatment refusal decision, why does he 
not feel that physicians should make that clear to the patient? At one 
point, Professor Katz gives us an example of the kind of conversation 
he would like to have been able to conduct with Mr. D. in an effort to 
have him share his reasons for refusing treatment. 
Had I encountered Mr. D., I would have told him that I was puz-
zled by his refusal to undergo the proposed diagnostic tests. I 
would have expressed to him my concern and confusion over my 
lack of understanding of what had led him to his decision, as well as 
my concern and fear of perhaps not having adequately conveyed to 
him why I thought that these tests were so essential to his well-
being. 
I would have impressed on him the necessity of our talking 
together. Indeed, I would have insisted on our talking together as 
long as time permitted in order to clarify our respective positions. I 
would have promised him that I had every intention of ultimately 
respecting his wishes, but that I could not make an absolute promise 
to do so, for it could turn out that the acuteness and seriousness of 
his condition might require an intervention prior to our having 
made ourselves understood to one another. I would have added 
that I expected this to be an unlikely outcome, but that it could 
happen. Throughout, I would have tried to convey to Mr. D. that 
my insistence on conversation was based on two concepts: to make 
sure that I had cleared up any of his misconceptions and confusion 
about the need for the diagnostic tests, and that he understood why 
I considered the performance of these tests so essential. 
If in the midst of our talking together, Mr. D. had "turned 
away," and bid me to "leave [him] alone," I would not have left his 
bedside. . . . I would have felt impotent and experienced Mr. D. as 
all powerful. And I would have recalled what Burt had written in 
Taking Care of Strangers6 that such depictions of myself and him 
might have enraged me and made me turn away out of an uncon-
scious wish to hurt him. At the same time, I might have overlooked 
that the patient too, appearances notwithstanding, was struggling 
with feelings of impotence out of "the intense stress [he was suffer-
6. R . BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF L AW IN DOCTOR-PA-
TIENT RELATIONS (1979). 
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ing] from the incapacitating experience of his illness." Thus, I 
would have stayed with him and renewed my invitation to talk with 
one another. Had he continued to decline the invitation, I would 
eventually have been forced to tell him that I might very well order 
the tests, place him on a respirator, and resuscitate him if he refused 
to talk with me. "There is too much that we both do not under-
stand," I would have added, "and you must not hide behind si-
lence" (pp.158-59). 
Although there is, at the outset, some mention of the physicians' 
fear that they might have failed to convey adequately the facts to their 
patients, the discussion quickly becomes impersonal, unemotional, and 
deontological in tone. At times Professor Katz makes it appear that 
some impersonal force of reason has taken over the relationship. "Ne-
cessity" dictates that doctor and patient talk together. The "acuteness 
and seriousness of the patients' condition might require" an interven-
tion. The physician might be "forced" to order the tests and the use of 
a respirator to resuscitate the patient. The patient "must not" hide 
behind silence. At other times the physician admits to responsibility 
as an active participant in the events, but in a fashion which an-
nounces that the physician ultimately controls the relationship. The 
doctor "insists" that they talk together and decides whether their con-
versation is up to standard. If it is not, the doctor gets to order the 
tests. Is this the way that two autonomous human beings are to carry 
on a conversation? Where are "Try to see things my way," "Would 
you be willing to do this for me?" and "Please!"? To what extent is 
the patient made to feel autonomous? In one version of the presenta-
tion, the patient is made to feel that both doctor and patient are at the 
mercy of the dictates of reason. In the other, the patient is made to 
feel ultimately at the mercy of the doctor. Is this more or less likely to 
make the patient feel like conversing? 
At the conclusion of the section on "Overruling Patients' 
Choices," Professor Katz suggests that doctors would rarely be faced 
with the necessity for overruling such choices if the medical profession 
took seriously the need for "conversation in preparation for choice." 
Patients would soon learn from their doctors' example that decision 
making in medicine can rarely be carried out in isolation, but only 
through mutual interaction. Thomas Aquinas appreciated this when 
he spoke of the need for "fraternal correction." Or as Paul Tillich 
once put it, "humanity is attained by self-determination and by 
other-determination in mutual dependence." Such insights will 
eventually make my limited exception to patient choice a relic of the 
past. Patients will learn to be less afraid to voice their reasons for 
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refusal because they will be confident that such disclosures will only 
invite "fraternal correction" through conversation, but no more 
than that (p. 163).7 
39 
But the sort of doctor-patient conversation which Professor Katz of-
fers us does not seem one of "mutual dependence" which risks only 
"fraternal correction." It is one in which the patient is made to feel 
that the doctor carries the ultimate authority. The doctor has merely 
conceded to the patient some portion of the decisionmaking authority 
subject to the condition that the patient pass some test by giving the 
"right" answers concerning the reasons for refusing treatment. As 
with Burt's doctor, why wouldn't such a situation of impotence be 
most likely to enrage the patient and cause him or her to turn away 
out of a desire to hurt the physician? 
To make the needed correction here, we need only take Professor 
Katz's principles of doctor-patient conversation a step further. 
Throughout his book he has called upon doctors to be more honest 
with themselves and their patients about the uncertainties of medicine 
and their own professional limitations. Professor Katz has said that: 
[P]hysicians must first learn to trust themselves to face up to and 
acknowledge the tragic limitations of their own professional knowl-
edge; their inability to impart all their insights to all patients; and 
their own personal incapacities-at times more pronounced than at 
others-to devote themselves fully to their patients' needs. They 
must also learn not to be unduly embarrassed by their personal and 
professional ignorance and to trust their patients to react appropri-
ately to such acknowledgments (pp. 102-03). 
What is needed now is to extend these insights to the level of the doc-
tors' feelings of neediness and weakness in the doctor- patient relation-
ship. Doctors need to acknowledge to themselves and their patients 
that it is out of their need and weakness that they are asking the pa-
tient to engage in conversation regarding the reasons for refusing 
treatment. Although the doctor can, of course, attempt to force a dis-
cussion through the threat of coerced treatment, the resulting dialogue 
is unlikely to be the kind of true conversation that Professor Katz 
would like. Much better-and much more likely to be effective-
would be for doctors to make clear that they are asking the patient for 
afavor. The doctors should share with the patient that it is the doctors 
who are made to feel impotent by the patient's refusal to talk and that 
they view the patient as "all-powerful" as a result. Doctors should 
7. (citations omitted). 
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make clear that what they need is to be reassured by their patients that 
the patient's refusal to accept treatment is not the result of some fail-
ing in the doctor's handling of the case and its presentation. Patients 
thus realize that they are no longer impotent subjects being put 
through some test by those in authority before they can get what they 
want. Rather, one human being is asking another human being to do 
the first human being a favor. It is a favor which costs the patient very 
little. And it is a favor which clearly means a great deal to the doc-
tor-someone who has done a great many favors for the patient in the 
past and stands ready to do more in the future. Is it likely that any 
patient would refuse such a request? 
At one point in the book, Professor Katz urges upon his doctor-
readers8 an effort to disabuse their patients of irrational and uncon-
scious expectations that the doctor will play the role of parent with 
them. At the same time, he cautions them not to expect instant suc-
cess in that effort: 
Such efforts will not always meet with success and, indeed, can 
never be totally successful. However hard one tries to be true to 
Rousseau's aphorism that 'It is better to know one's chains than to 
deck them with flowers,' some chains that imprison the human 
mind inevitably remain decked with flowers (p. 147). 
Of course, Professor Katz does not need to be convinced that there is 
8. That Professor Katz has so obviously written the book for the doctor-reader raises 
a problem which is related to the theme of this essay. It is a further betrayal of vestiges of 
paternalism within Professor Katz that he believes that ultimate responsibility for develop-
ing meaningful conversation with the patient resides with the doctor. In the book's closing 
pages, Professor Katz states: "Both physicians and patients must rethink basic assump-
tions about their relationship and about mutual decision making. Physicians here must take 
the initiative and lead the way." KATZ, supra note I, at 229. Not surprisingly, this attitude 
becomes even more manifest when he sees aspects of his own medical specialty implicated 
in the effort. "A greater awareness by both parties of the power of transference and the 
obligation ... must be assumed by professionals rather than by their patients. Patients can 
only learn of the power of transference over time and through personal experiences with 
aware physicians who educate them about its manifestations." KATZ, supra note I, at 144-45 
(emphasis supplied). Are patients really so childlike and incompetent that they are incapa-
ble of learning for themselves and from each other of the tendency toward and dangers of 
the parent/child relationship in medicine? If evidence that they are not were needed, the 
experience of the People's Medical Society would seem to be one source for supplying it. 
Professor Katz could have written the book for patients, calling upon them to act in a 
more adult fashion with their doctors and to pressure their doctors to be more adult and 
less parental. Or he could have called upon both doctor and patient to exhibit and request 
more adult behavior. The fact that Professor Katz addressed the book to doctors and 
recognizes them as ultimately responsible for making informed consent work subtly rein-
forces the very dependency of the patient which Professor Katz otherwise seeks to 
eliminate. 
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at least as much difficulty in getting doctors to know the chains that 
imprison their minds. Doctors are at least as interested in seeing their 
patients as needy and grateful children as patients are in seeing their 
doctors as caring and omnipotent parents. His book does a brilliant 
job of attempting to get the medical community to know those chains 
and to rid itself of them by allowing a more adult-adult relationship to 
develop between doctor and patient. That the book stops short of tak-
ing the relationship to an even higher level along the continuum which 
he himself has plotted is no great criticism of what Professor Katz has 
done. Indeed, it is a form of criticism which attempts to build upon 
what Professor Katz has done and is therefore likely to be welcomed 
by him-even if he believes it to be mistaken. 
In the introduction to the book, Professor Katz emphasizes that 
he views as preliminary the work which has been done on the phenom-
enon of informed consent. He observes: 
These problems deserve study and their in-depth analysis must be 
extended beyond where I leave off. The more I reflect about in-
formed consent the more I appreciate how many additional leads 
need to be pursued. In this book I have been unable to explore any 
to their depth. Instead, I have tried to identify as many issues as 
possible and to pursue them for some distance (p. xx). 
And at another point, he states: "This book's ultimate purpose is to 
initiate a more enlightened debate about the respective rights, duties, 
and needs of physicians and patients in their intimate, anxiety produc-
ing, and fateful encounters with one another" (p. xxii). Thus the me-
dium is the message. Constantly improving conversation among 
contributing discussants is what is needed to constantly improve the 
conversation between doctor and patient which is the subject of the 
discussion. For that effort, Professor Katz provides us with an exem-
plary role model-not only by the excellent work which he has done 
in helping others to know their chains, but also by the invitation he 
issues to have others show him his own. 
